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Cyber Crime and Punishment:
Filtering Out Internet Felons
Jessica Habib*
INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 2003, Kevin Mitnick once again became a free
man.1 In 1999, the hacker once labeled “the most-wanted
computer criminal in U.S. history” by the government2 pled guilty
to “possession of unauthorized access devices with intent to
defraud in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)].”3 Mitnick’s
prison term ended in January 2000, after which he was subjected to
a three-year period of supervised release.4 During this period, he
was denied access to “computers, computer-related equipment and
certain
telecommunications
devices,
including
cellular
telephones,” without the prior approval of his probation officer.5
The terms of Mitnick’s release prohibited him from using the
Internet during this period,6 a probation condition that has become
a controversial issue and has generated disagreement among the

*
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A. Wesleyan
University, 1999. The author would like to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg for his
comments and encouragement. She also would like to thank her family for its abundant
love and support throughout law school and beyond.
1
See Matt Richtel, Barring Web Use After Web Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at
A1.
2
Id.
3
United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *1 (9th
Cir. May 20, 1998).
4
See Richtel, supra note 1 (noting that Mitnick was released from prison in January
2000 and that he could not use the Internet until January 2003).
5
Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2.
6
See Richtel, supra note 1.
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courts.7 According to Mitnick, “‘[n]ot being allowed to use the
Internet is kind of like not being allowed to use a telephone’”8—an
argument that has been embraced by some courts.9 On the other
hand, proponents of banning Internet access by cyber-criminals
focus on the Internet’s role in committing the crime and reject the
argument that Internet restrictions entail a great hardship.10
The abundant data on the extent of Internet use shows that the
Internet has become an indispensable tool for a myriad of uses.11
As such, it has revolutionized information gathering and
communication and has transformed the economy.12 The number
of people using online resources has grown rapidly in recent years
and continues to proliferate.13 For these reasons, it seems that
supervised release conditions that ban or restrict Internet use would
hamper an individual’s access to an extremely valuable medium
and, thus, should not be permitted. In fact, several felons have
challenged such deprivations as unconstitutional, often based on
First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and of the
press.14 Sentencing courts, however, are granted wide discretion in
determining supervised release conditions and must balance the
protection of the public with the liberty interests of the convicted
individual.15 In so doing, some courts have given greater weight to
the former consideration and have upheld the conditions;16 others
have emphasized the latter in rejecting such sentencing
conditions.17 In light of the broad discretion of the courts, they
clearly have the authority to impose such conditions. Courts
7

See id. (noting that U.S. circuit courts of appeal have reached different conclusions
as to the validity of Internet-use restrictions).
8
Associated Press, F.C.C. Lets Convicted Hacker Go Back On Air (Dec. 27, 2002)
[hereinafter Associated Press, Hacker Back On Air], available at 2003 WL 3734116.
9
See discussion infra Part II.A.
10
See discussion infra Part II.B.
11
See discussion infra Part I.B.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
E.g., United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *1 (9th Cir. May 20, 1998); see also discussion infra Part
III.B (discussing First Amendment challenges to probation conditions).
15
See discussion infra Part I.A.
16
See discussion infra Part II.B.
17
See discussion infra Part II.A.
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determining the appropriateness of such conditions, however,
should focus narrowly on the Internet’s role in facilitating the
crime and whether the restriction will prevent the underlying
criminal conduct.
Part I of this Note will introduce the federal guidelines and
goals used to determine supervised release conditions and will
discuss the extent to which the Internet has become a routine and
necessary feature of society. Part II will address the split among
courts that have upheld or overturned Internet-use bans as a part of
supervised release. Part III will explore the factors that these
courts have employed in making their decisions by distinguishing
different types of computer crime and comparing the ban on
Internet use to other instances where convicts have been deprived
of what are normally considered fundamental rights and liberties.
This part will argue that given the pervasiveness of Internet use in
modern society and the Internet’s fundamental role in facilitating
communication, courts should tailor supervised release conditions
carefully to reflect how the Internet use related to the criminal act.
I. SENTENCING DISCRETION VERSUS THE NATURE
OF THE INTERNET
At the heart of the controversy surrounding supervised release
restrictions on Internet use is the tension between the broad
discretion courts may exercise in the area of supervised release
conditions and the Internet’s pervasiveness in modern society.18 A
court must use its discretion to consider its competing obligations
to society and to the convict poised to reenter society, with certain
statutory criteria to guide its decisions.19 These decisions become
even more complex if the realities of modern life—in this case, the

18

See generally Brian W. McKay, Note, Guardrails on the Information Superhighway:
Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 203,
219–33 (2003) (discussing the split among U.S. circuit courts of appeal with respect to
Internet bans).
19
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5D1.1–.3 (guidelines
on imposing a term of supervised release); see also Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha & Omega
of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV. 267, 269–85 (1996) (discussing the requirements
for imposing a term of supervised release).
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extent to which the Internet has become an essential means of
communication—are also considered.
A. Sentencing Guidelines and Goals
In general, courts may exercise considerable discretion in
determining whether to sentence an offender to a term of
supervised release and what the conditions should be, limited by
the class of felony.20 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, a court choosing to
include such a term must impose on the defendant certain
mandatory restrictions, principally addressing the commission of
other crimes as well as the use of controlled substances.21 In
addition, the penultimate sentence of section 3583(d) states that a
court may order “any other condition it considers to be
appropriate,”22 thus conferring broad discretion upon courts to
establish further conditions.
The judgment of the courts is subject to three limitations,
however. First, section 3583(d)(1) states that the condition must
be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D).”23 These factors are “the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant”24 and the need for the sentence, inter alia, to
deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide the
20

See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2000) (inclusion of a term of supervised release
after imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (listing the authorized time periods of
supervised release for each class of felony, the longest of which is five years).
21
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (conditions of supervised release).
22
Id. The section states, in pertinent part:
The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent
that such condition—
(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D);
(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for
the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and
(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a);
any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section
3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and any other
condition it considers to be appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
23
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1).
24
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000).
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defendant with educational training or medical care.25 Several
courts have found Internet bans appropriate based on these
factors,26 suggesting that this provision of Section 3583(d) does not
significantly limit a sentencing court’s discretion.27
Second, section 3583(d)(2) sets forth another important
limitation, prohibiting the infliction of any “greater deprivation of
liberty than reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in
section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(D).”28 This factor has
been critical in the decisions of several appeals courts to reject
release conditions prohibiting Internet access, based upon their
perception of the role of the Internet with respect to everyday
activities.29 The third limitation is that the condition must be
“consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a),” which
generally refers to various provisions and purposes of title 18.30

25

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
See infra Part II.B.
27
For example, in United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit needed only one paragraph to find a district court’s
Internet restrictions acceptable under the standards of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). See id. at
127–28. The issue under section 3583(d)(2)—whether the restrictions constituted a
greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary—received more extensive
analysis. See id. at 128.
28
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); see also supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (listing
the relevant provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553).
29
See infra Part II.A.
30
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). 18 U.S.C. § 994(a) states:
The Commission, by affirmative vote of at least four members of the
Commission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations and consistent with all
pertinent provisions of any Federal statute shall promulgate and distribute to all
courts of the United States and to the United States Probation System—
(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use of a sentencing court in
determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case, including—
(A) a determination whether to impose a sentence to probation, a fine, or a
term of imprisonment;
(B) a determination as to the appropriate amount of a fine or the appropriate
length of a term of probation or a term of imprisonment;
(C) a determination whether a sentence to a term of imprisonment should
include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised
release after imprisonment, and, if so, the appropriate length of such a term;
(D) a determination whether multiple sentences to terms of imprisonment
should be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively; and
26
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Clearly, courts have the authority to decide that an offender
should be banned from using the Internet, as long as this condition
comports with the factors described above. The question remains,
however, whether this power should be used to fashion such a
condition, given the Internet’s prevalence in modern society. The
difficulty lies in balancing the sentencing goals of protecting the
public and the liberty of the individual, in a context where the
Internet has become synonymous with the free flow of
information, ideas, and communication.
B. Internet Use
Much of the information about Internet use that the courts rely
upon seems to be based on anecdotal evidence,31 but there is a
great deal of empirical evidence on the subject as well.32 Several
courts, such as those in United States v. Sofsky,33 United States v.
Peterson,34 and United States v. White35 have emphasized the

31
32
33
34
35

(E) a determination under paragraphs (6) and (11) of section 3563(b) of title
18;
(2) general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any
other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the
Commission would further the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title
18, United States Code, including the appropriate use of—
(A) the sanctions set forth in sections 3554, 3555, and 3556 of title 18;
(B) the conditions of probation and supervised release set forth in sections
3563(b) and 3583(d) of title 18;
(C) the sentence modification provisions set forth in sections 3563(c), 3564,
3573, and 3582(c) of title 18;
(D) the fine imposition provisions set forth in section 3572 of title 18;
(E) the authority granted under rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to accept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursuant to rule
11(e)(1); and
(F) the temporary release provisions set forth in section 3622 of title 18, and
the prerelease custody provisions set forth in section 3624(c) of title 18; and
(3) guidelines or general policy statements regarding the appropriate use of
the provisions for revocation of probation set forth in section 3565 of title 18,
and the provisions for modification of the term or conditions of supervised
release and revocation of supervised release set forth in section 3583(e) of title
18.
See, e.g., infra notes 78, 99–101 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 39–65.
287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002).
248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001).
244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
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ubiquity of the Internet in overturning sentencing conditions that
banned Internet use.36 Courts affirming such restrictions, such as
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v.
Crandon,37 have acknowledged the Internet’s prevalence, but
ultimately justified their rulings on alternative factors.38
The Internet’s pervasiveness and explosive growth is well
described in a 2002 U.S. Commerce Department Report, titled “A
Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the
Internet” (“Commerce Department report”): “Few technologies
have spread as quickly, or become so widely used, as computers
and the Internet. These information technologies are rapidly
becoming common fixtures of modern social and economic life,
opening opportunities and new avenues for many Americans.”39
Indeed, a significant portion of the population now relies on the
Internet to conduct various activities of daily life, as it is a
powerful tool with countless practical uses, including
communication, education, research, employment, shopping, and
entertainment.40 According to Jeffrey Cole, director of the
University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) Center for
Communication Policy, “The Internet has surpassed all other major
information sources in importance after only about eight years as a
generally available communications tool.”41 A year-to-year UCLA
study found that among Internet users, the Internet ranked above
books, newspapers, television, radio, and magazines as a very
important or extremely important information source.42
36

See infra Part II.A.
173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
38
See infra Part II.B.
39
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: HOW AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR
USE OF THE INTERNET 1 (2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn (last
visited Mar. 24, 2004). The report, generated with U.S. Census Bureau data, was jointly
prepared by two Commerce Department agencies: the Economics and Statistics
Administration and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration.
See id.
40
See infra notes 42–65.
41
Dawn Kawamoto, Net Ranks as Top Information Source, ZD Net News, at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-982995.html (Jan. 31, 2003).
42
See UCLA CTR. FOR COMMUNICATION POLICY, THE UCLA INTERNET REPORT:
SURVEYING THE DIGITAL FUTURE 82 (2003) (noting that nearly three-quarters of Internet
users consider the Internet to be a very important or extremely important source of
information, a ranking higher than for books, television, radio, newspapers, or
37
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Other studies have focused on the types of information
gathered on the Internet, demonstrating that its utility as an
information source has many aspects.43 For example, one study
concluded that about two-thirds of all Americans, Internet users
and non-users alike, expect to find information about health care,
government agencies, news, and commerce on the Internet.44
Among Internet users alone, the study concluded that about eighty
percent expected to find such information online.45 Furthermore,
thirty-nine percent of all Americans said that they would first turn
to the Internet for government information, and thirty-one percent
would first look online for health-care information.46 Along with
underscoring expectations about the accessibility and dependability
of this information, this result also indicates that people are willing
to rely on the Internet as their initial source of information about
two essential, even personal, issues. Indeed, the court in United
States v. White compared the Internet to books, based on the
instant access to the information it provides.47

magazines), available at http://ccp.ucla.edu/pages/internet-report.asp (last visited Mar.
19, 2004).
43
See JOHN B. HORRIGAN & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
COUNTING ON THE INTERNET 5 (2002) (“The dissemination of the Internet has transformed
how many Americans find information and altered how they engage with many
institutions, such as government, health care providers, the news media, and commercial
enterprises.”), available at http://www.pewInternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=80 (last
visited April 8, 2004).
44
See id. at 2. The study found that sixty-five percent of all Americans expect to find
government-agency information or services on the World Wide Web. Id. Additionally,
sixty-three percent of all Americans expect that a business will have a Web site giving
them information about a product they are considering buying; sixty-nine percent expect
to find reliable, current news online; and sixty-seven percent expect to find reliable
information about health or medical conditions on the Web. Id.
45
See id. The study found that eighty-two percent of Internet users expect to find to
find government-agency information or services online; seventy-nine percent expect that
a business will have a Web site giving them information about a product they are
considering buying; eighty-five percent expect to find reliable, current news online; and
eighty-one percent expect to find reliable information about health or medical conditions
on the Web. Id.
46
Id. at 8.
47
See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The
communication facilitated by [information technology] may be likened to that of the
telephone. Its instant link to information is akin to opening a book.”).
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With Internet use expanding across the population—regardless
of income, education, race, age, ethnicity, or gender48—the
Internet also is furthering democratic governance by helping local
officials and their constituents communicate.49 A Pew Internet &
American Life Project (“Pew”) survey of 2,000 mayors and city
council members concluded that “local officials have embraced the
Internet as part of their official lives and most now use email to
communicate with constituents,” noting that that eighty-eight
percent of local officials use the Internet in the course of their
official duties.50 Among these “online officials,” sixty-one percent
use e-mail to communicate with citizens at least weekly, and
seventy-five percent use the World Wide Web (“Web”) at least
weekly for research in the course of their official duties.51
Furthermore, the survey indicated that local officials learn about
their constituents’ activities and opinions through the Internet, and
more local groups are getting recognized or heard in this fashion.52
Therefore, in addition to learning about government services on the
Internet, people are increasingly going online to communicate with
their representatives and to participate in civic affairs, while
elected officials have turned to the Internet to communicate with
their constituents.53 The Internet is not the exclusive method by
which citizens participate in government, but such use will likely

48

See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 1.
See Christopher Swope, E-Gov’s New Gear, GOVERNING, Mar. 2004 (noting that
states, cities, and counties are “trying out new modes of interactivity, channeling public
participation both over the Internet and in face-to-face high-tech town hall meetings”),
available at http://www.governing.com/archive/2004/mar/interact.txt (last visited April 9,
2004).
50
ELENA LARSEN & LEE RAINIE, DIGITAL TOWN HALL 1 (2002) (prepared for the Pew
Internet & American Life Project), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=74 (last visited March 25, 2004).
51
Id.
52
Id. The report does caution, however, that “while the use of email adds to the
convenience and depth of civic exchanges, its use is not ushering a revolution in
municipal affairs or local politics.” Id.
53
See, e.g., Charles Bermant, E-Mails to Officials Can Help You Blow Off Steam,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004 (urging residents to write e-mail messages to local officials
and stating that letter writers “should expect an individual look-in-the-eye response”),
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/inbox/2001833798_ptinbo10.html
(last visited March 25, 2004).
49
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continue to grow, potentially putting those deprived of Internet use
at a disadvantage in these essential matters.
Searching for employment is another rapidly growing type of
Internet use.54 Between March 2000 and May 2002, the number of
Americans who looked for employment online increased by sixty
percent, according to another Pew study.55 Although percentages
of Internet users looking for jobs online vary by sex, race, age, and
class, forty-seven percent of all adult Internet users in the United
States have looked online for job information.56 In addition, the
study found that fifty-two million Americans have looked on the
Web for information about jobs, “and more than [four] million do
so on a typical day.”57 Furthermore, this study indicates that many
have found the Internet useful in obtaining additional job
training.58 These numbers show that the Internet is now widely
used for researching employment opportunities. Some obvious
reasons for this growth include the efficiency of using online
services, such as Vault.com and Monster.com, to research job
opportunities throughout the country and distribute résumés, as
well as the facility with which users can search online editions of
newspapers from other locales.59
The Internet is not only widely used to find employment, but
also has become ubiquitous in the workplace as well.60 Employed

54
See infra notes 55–59; see also Lorraine Farquharson, The Best Way to . . .
Find a Job, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2003 (discussing different ways to use the Internet to
find a job).
55
ANGIE BOYCE & LEE RAINIE, ONLINE JOB HUNTING 1 (July 2002) (prepared for the
Pew Internet & American Life Project), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=65 (last visited March 25, 2004).
56
Id. at 2.
57
Id. at 1.
58
See id. at 2 (stating that of the forty-seven million Internet users who had sought
additional career education or training in the preceding two years, twenty-nine percent
reported that their use of the Internet played an important role in their securing the
training).
59
For example, the New York Times Web site provides access to job listings at
http://www.nytimes.com/pages/jobs/index.html.
60
See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 60 (“The workplace provides an
important venue for many adults to use computers and the Internet.”); DEBORAH
FALLOWS, EMAIL AT WORK: FEW FEEL OVERWHELMED AND MOST ARE PLEASED WITH THE
WAY EMAIL HELPS THEM DO THEIR JOBS 5 (2002) (prepared for the Pew Internet &
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adults ages twenty-five and over use their computer at work more
frequently to access the Internet and e-mail than for any other
purpose, including word processing, desktop publishing,
spreadsheets, databases, and graphics and design, according to the
Commerce Department report.61 About forty-two percent of these
workers used the Internet and e-mail at work by September 2001,
up from about twenty-six percent in August 2000.62 These figures
demonstrate that Internet use at work has become prevalent and
continues to grow, likely due to the ease with which the Internet
allows people to communicate. This is an important consideration
with respect to Internet use restrictions, especially since such a
restriction could last up to five years under the sentencing
guidelines, depending on the class of felony.63
As yet another Pew study emphasizes, people increasingly turn
to the Internet at “major life moments.”64 Of those Internet users
who had experienced one of the major life moments identified in
the survey over a certain period, the greatest proportion said that
the Internet played a crucial role in choosing a school or college
(thirty-six percent), followed by starting a new hobby (thirty-three
percent), obtaining additional career training (twenty-nine percent),
buying a new car (twenty-seven percent), helping another person
deal with a major illness (twenty-six percent), and changing jobs
(twenty-five percent).65
These results, as well as the findings discussed above, illustrate
the myriad of Internet applications to daily life, in which the quest
for information is the common denominator. The growth of
Internet use is both rapid and widespread, and the variety of
American Life Project) (“The use of email has become almost mandatory in most U.S.
workplaces.”).
61
See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 60.
62
Id. at 57, 60.
63
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (2000).
64
See NATHAN KOMMERS & LEE RAINIE, USE OF THE INTERNET AT MAJOR LIFE
MOMENTS 2 (2002) (prepared for the Pew Internet & American Life Project) (stating that
information on the Web is important to significant numbers of Americans when they are
making important choices related to education and job training, investments and large
purchases, and health care), available at http://www.pewInternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=58 (last visited March 21, 2004).
65
Id. at 3. The survey questioned 1,415 Internet users about a total of 15 different
major life events. Id. at 2.
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matters for which people increasingly seek information online—
from mundane personal choices to significant life decisions—
demonstrate a high level of comfort with the information it has to
offer.66
The conclusion to the Commerce Department report states in
part:
The Internet has become a tool that is accessible to and
adopted by Americans in communities across the
nation.. . .As a result, we are more and more becoming a
nation online: a nation that can take advantage of the
information resources provided by the Internet, as well as a
nation developing the technical skills to compete in our
global economy.67
In addition to its many social and other practical uses, the
Internet is a necessary tool of economic competition, which begs
the question: to what extent does deprivation of its use put people
at an economic disadvantage?68 The numerous surveys and studies
regarding Internet usage establish an important backdrop against

66

See Toni Fitzgerald, America’s Growing Web Dependence, MEDIA LIFE (discussing a
Pew Internet & American Life Project study and expressing surprise at “how quickly
Americans have come to trust the information” found on the Internet), at
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/news2003/jan03/jan20/5_fri/news1friday.html (Jan.
24, 2003); Press Release, UCLA Ctr. for Communication Policy, First Release of
Findings From the UCLA World Internet Project Shows Significant ‘Digital Gender Gap’
in Many Countries (Jan. 14, 2004) (statement of Director Jeffrey Cole) (stating that most
Internet users worldwide “generally trust the information they find online”), available at
http://ccp.ucla.edu/pages/NewsTopics.asp?Id=45 (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
67
See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 91.
68
See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding
that restrictions on Internet use and computer ownership constitute “an occupational
restriction” and noting that the items prohibited under the conditions “include technology
that [the defendant] would likely need to hold any computer-related job”); see also Doug
Hyne, Note, Examining the Legal Challenges to the Restriction of Computer Access as a
Term of Probation or Supervised Release, 28 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
215, 216 (2002) (“[O]ne can foresee a future where the majority of occupations will, at
least in some way, necessitate that an employee use the internet. In light of this fact,
restricting the use of the internet as a term of probation may hamper an individual from
gaining employment.”).
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which to examine supervised release conditions that may limit
access to the Internet’s abundant uses.69
II. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO INTERNET CRIME SENTENCING
There are several key factors that the federal appeals courts
have weighed in their consideration of supervised release
conditions that ban Internet access, computer use, or both.70
Outcomes have often turned on a particular court’s view of the role
of the Internet and whether its use was incidental or necessary to
commit the crime.71 While such cases require the examination of
several criteria, the principal factors may be gleaned from these
highly fact-specific cases.72
A. Indispensability of the Internet and the Deprivation of Liberty
Some courts have concluded that a member of modern society
cannot afford to be without Internet or computer access, and, thus,
generally have overturned prohibitions on Internet use during the
supervised release period.73 The Second Circuit, for example,
developed a position on the Internet to which it has adhered rather
strictly in two such decisions.74 In United States v. Peterson,75 the
court struck down an Internet ban imposed on a felon who had pled
guilty to bank larceny, was previously convicted of incest, and had
69
See Richtel, supra note 1 (statement of Jennifer S. Granick, Director, Stanford Center
for Internet and Society) (“The A.T.M. is a computer; the car has a computer; the Palm
Pilot is a computer. Without a computer in this day and age, you can’t work, you can’t
communicate, you can’t function as people normally do in modern society.”).
70
See discussion infra Parts II.A–.B.
71
Compare Peterson, 248 F.3d at 82 (holding that restrictions on defendant’s computer
ownership and Internet access are not reasonably related, inter alia, to the nature and
circumstances of the offense), with United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d
Cir. 1999) (noting that defendant used the Internet “as a means to develop an illegal
sexual relationship with a young girl” and concluding that a restriction on defendant’s
Internet access is “related to the dual aims of deterring him from recidivism and
protecting the public”).
72
See discussion infra Parts II.A–.B.
73
E.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003); United States
v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002); Peterson, 248 F.3d at 81–84; United States
v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206–08 (10th Cir. 2001).
74
See Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; Peterson, 248 F.3d 79.
75
248 F.3d 79.
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accessed legal adult pornography on his home computer.76 The
court found that the prohibition was not “‘reasonably related’” to
Peterson’s offense,77 and clarified its position with respect to the
Internet:
Computers and Internet access have become virtually
indispensable in the modern world of communications and
information gathering. The fact that a computer with
Internet access offers the possibility of abusive use for
illegitimate purposes does not, at least in this case, justify
so broad a prohibition. Although a defendant might use the
telephone to commit fraud, this would not justify a
condition of probation that includes an absolute bar on the
use of telephones. Nor would defendant’s proclivity
toward pornography justify a ban on all books, magazines,
and newspapers.78
In comparing the Internet to commonplace items such as the
telephone and newspapers, the court signaled in this instance that
the value of the Internet outweighed the potential for abuse.79
Peterson’s Internet restrictions also prohibited the use of
“‘commercial computer systems/services’ for employment
purposes without a probation officer’s permission,”80 in addition to
a complete ban on all technology (such as a CD-ROM and other
storage devices) necessary to connect to the Internet or even to
work at a computer-related job, as the Second Circuit noted.81 The
court noted that the defendant “consistently worked in computerrelated jobs and, beginning in May 1997, operated his own
computer business” and, thus, concluded that the Internet and
computer restrictions were not reasonably related to the bank
76

Id. at 81, 84.
Id. at 82 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)).
78
Id. at 83 (computer restriction which “would bar [defendant] from using a computer
at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online” was
excessively broad) (citing White, 244 F.3d at 1206).
79
See id.; see also Donna A. Gallagher, Comment, Free Speech on the Line: Modern
Technology and the First Amendment, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 197, 199 (1995)
(arguing that although electronic bulletin board services can facilitate abuse, “the positive
impact of the Internet greatly outweighs the negative”).
80
Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83.
81
See id. at 81, 83–84.
77
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larceny conviction.82
The sentencing condition would
unnecessarily hamper such employment during the supervised
release period, the court found.83
Applying the reasoning in Peterson, the Second Circuit
reversed an Internet ban in another notable case, United States v.
Sofsky.84
Gregory Sofsky pled guilty to receiving child
pornography in light of evidence that he downloaded over 1,000
images of child pornography from the Internet and exchanged
images with others online.85 He was sentenced to ten years in
prison, to be followed by a term of supervised release during
which, inter alia, he was not allowed to access the computer or
Internet without approval of a probation officer.86 Sofsky’s
conduct was more closely related to the Internet than the offense in
Peterson,87 and the conditions allowed Sofsky to obtain approved
access.88 In addition, the court acknowledged that Sofsky’s access
to computers and the Internet could “facilitate . . . his electronic
receipt of child pornography.”89 The court relied on its stance in
Peterson to vacate the ban and remand the case to the district court
for a more restricted condition, however, finding that it “inflict[ed]
a greater deprivation on Sofsky’s liberty than [was] reasonably
necessary,”90 in the language of the federal supervised release
guidelines.91
The Sofsky court expanded upon the statement in Peterson that
a defendant’s use of the telephone to commit fraud would not
justify a complete ban on telephone use:92 “The same could be said
of a prohibition on the use of the mails imposed on a defendant
82

Id. at 84.
See id.
84
See Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122.
85
Id. at 124.
86
Id.
87
See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that defendant in Peterson had
pled guilty to bank larceny and was previously convicted of incest, and had accessed
legal adult pornography on his home computer).
88
Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 124.
89
Id. at 126.
90
Id.
91
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
92
See Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126 (citing Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83); see also supra note 78
and accompanying text.
83
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convicted of mail fraud. A total ban on Internet access prevents
use of e-mail, an increasingly widely used form of
communication . . . .”93
This line of reasoning indicates a
reluctance to identify the Internet as the root of the underlying
conduct, although in this case the court acknowledged that the
Internet could facilitate the continuation of the criminal act for
which the defendant was convicted.94 However, the fact that the
Internet was incidental to the commission of the underlying
crime—that is, the crime could have been committed without
going online—may have made the court less willing to restrict
access to the Internet for legitimate purposes.95 Although Sofsky
could seek approval from his probation officer to use the Internet,
the court still concluded that the condition was too restrictive, and
that the possibility for abuse should not prevent access to such
indispensable technology.96
Other circuits have relied on similar reasoning. For example,
the Tenth Circuit in United States v. White was unwilling to uphold
an Internet ban in the sentencing of Robert Emerson White, who
was caught purchasing child pornography videos online by a
government sting operation.97 The court took issue with the
wording of the condition, which stated that White “‘shall not
possess a computer with Internet access throughout his period of
supervised release.’”98 The court thought that a restriction on the
possession of a computer with Internet access “missed the mark” if
the district court intended to prevent access to online child
pornography, since White could simply access the Internet on a
computer he did not own.99 The court also thought that if
93

Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126.
Id. at 126, 127.
95
The distinction between Internet crime and Internet-related crime is discussed further
in Part III.A of this Note.
96
See Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126–27. The court suggested that a more focused restriction,
limited to pornography sites and images, could be enforced by unannounced inspections
of the defendant’s premises and examination of material stored on his or her computer
and software. Id. at 127. In addition, the court noted that the government could conduct a
sting operation on the defendant—“surreptitiously inviting him [or her] to respond to
Government placed Internet ads for pornography.” Id.
97
United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2001).
98
Id. at 1205.
99
Id.
94
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“possess” were to entail “the concept of use,” however, then the
condition was overbroad:
That reading would bar White from using a computer at a
library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a
newspaper online.
Under these circumstances, the special
condition is “greater than necessary,” and fails to balance the
competing interests the sentencing court must consider.100
The court clearly views the Internet as an essential tool with
many basic uses, and, as in Peterson and Sofsky, associates it with
other fundamental resources: “The communication facilitated by
this technology may be likened to that of the telephone. Its instant
link to information is akin to opening a book.”101
In this same vein, the Third Circuit denied an Internet ban
where a felon pled guilty to possession and receipt of child
pornography,102 which ostensibly did not involve the Internet.103
The court relied heavily on Sofsky for the proposition that
forbidding the felon, Robb Walker Freeman, from possessing a
computer or using any online computer service without written
permission of his probation officer was too great a deprivation of
liberty.104 Furthermore, the court noted that it was not necessary to
prevent “access to email or benign internet usage, when a more
focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images, can
be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on
Freeman’s hard drive or removable disks.”105
Evidently, some courts have focused on the nature of the
Internet as an indispensable tool with many practical and
commonplace uses in rendering their decisions about conditions of
supervised release that ban or severely restrict Internet use.106
Even in situations where the Internet played a role in the
commission of the crime, these courts have deemed a ban on
100

Id. at 1206 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1207.
102
United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003).
103
Id at 387.
104
See id. at 391–92.
105
Id. at 392.
106
E.g., Freeman, 316 F.3d 386; Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; United States v. Peterson, 248
F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001); White, 244 F.3d 1199.
101
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Internet use as a greater deprivation of liberty than allowed under
the supervised release guidelines.107 Conversely, other courts have
focused on the use of the Internet as essential tool to the
commission of the crime in reviewing, and often upholding,
Internet use prohibitions instituted by sentencing courts.108
B. The Internet as a Tool of Crime and the Protection of the
Public
When the trial court in United States v. Mitnick imposed
supervised release conditions on the infamous computer hacker
Kevin Mitnick, preventing his use of computers without probation
officer approval, he challenged the sentence as restrictive of his
First Amendment rights.109 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the conditions in a terse, unreported opinion,
stating simply: “[T]he conditions imposed are reasonably related to
legitimate sentencing goals and are no more restrictive than
necessary.”110 Mitnick broke into computer networks of large
corporations and stole software, acts that necessitated the use of
computers and the Internet.111 The Ninth Circuit relied on the
broad sentencing discretion of the district court to dismiss
Mitnick’s challenge, indicating that it viewed his computer use a
threat to the public.112 This leads to the inference that the court
considered the Internet an essential tool of Mitnick’s crimes, thus
justifying the ban.
In United States v. Crandon, another instance of an appellate
court upholding an Internet restriction, Richard Crandon pled
guilty to one count of receiving child pornography.113 His crime,
however, entailed much more than downloading illicit material;
Crandon met a fourteen-year-old girl online, ultimately meeting
107

E.g., Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; White, 244 F.3d 1199.
E.g., United States v. Harding, No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371 (3d Cir.
Jan. 28, 2003); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 10836 (9th Cir. May 20, 1998).
109
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2.
110
Id.
111
See Richtel, supra note 1.
112
Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2.
113
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 124.
108
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her in person to have sexual relations and take photographs of the
encounter.114 Crandon and the girl repeatedly spoke over the
telephone after the visit, discussing the prospect of his return to
Minnesota to bring her to his home in New Jersey.115 Crandon
returned to Minnesota the following month, at which time he and
the girl departed for New Jersey, although along the way he
learned that authorities were looking for them and, thus, he sent
her back to Minnesota.116
The Third Circuit acknowledged that “computer networks and
the Internet will continue to become an omnipresent aspect of
American life.”117 The court, however, rejected Crandon’s
argument that the supervised release condition banning access to
the Internet or other computer networks without approval of a
probation officer was not logically related to his offense, violating
his rights of speech and association.118 The court also rejected the
argument that the restrictions preventing “access to any form of
computer network”119 should be vacated because they hindered
Crandon’s employment opportunities due to the extent in which
businesses have “integrate[d] computers and the Internet into the
workplace.”120 Rather, the court concluded that the restrictions on
employment and First Amendment freedoms were acceptable
because the special condition “[was] narrowly tailored and [was]
directly related to deterring Crandon and protecting the public.”121
The court apparently found a direct relationship between the
Internet and the crime, unlike in Peterson,122 and was more
influenced by the defendant’s use of the Internet to victimize a
young girl than by his argument that the restriction would impede
his employment opportunities or constitutional rights.123 Thus, the
114

Id. at 125.
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 128.
118
See id. at 127–28.
119
Id. at 125.
120
See id. at 127–28.
121
Id. at 128.
122
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
123
See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128 (rejecting defendant’s argument that “as businesses
continue to integrate computers and the Internet into the workplace, the special condition
115
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court emphasized that the Internet was the instrument by which
Crandon developed a sexual relationship with the fourteen-yearold girl, from their initial meeting to their continuous
communication that resulted in his visit to Minnesota.124 The fact
that the Internet was not merely incidental to the commission of
the crime led the court to affirm the sentence as necessary to deter
such future conduct and protect the public.125
In United States v. Harding,126 the Third Circuit followed its
decision in Crandon to uphold an Internet ban imposed on Jamie
Harding, a man who was found with numerous photographs,
computer disks, and videotapes containing pornographic images of
children.127
The district court imposed supervised release
conditions banning him from accessing the Internet without the
prior approval of his probation officer.128 Although Harding was
apparently permitted to own a computer, the court required him to
consent to unannounced inspections of his computer equipment by
a probation officer to ensure that he did not connect to an Internet
server.129
The opinion did not clarify whether the images found on
Harding’s computer were retrieved from or distributed to others
through the Internet;130 the court did indicate that he possessed a
scanner,131 though that could simply mean that Harding preferred
to store the images digitally. Nonetheless, the court compared this
instance to Crandon to conclude that the ban was justifiable given
may hamper his employment opportunities upon release, as well as limit his freedoms of
speech and association”).
124
See id. at 125, 127.
125
Id. at 127–28. The court stated:
In this case, Crandon used the Internet as a means to develop an illegal sexual
relationship with a young girl over a period of several months. Given these
compelling circumstances, it seems clear that the condition of release limiting
Crandon’s Internet access is related to the dual aims of deterring him from
recidivism and protecting the public.
Id.
126
No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2003).
127
Id. at *2.
128
Id. at *2–*3.
129
Id. at *3.
130
See id. at *2.
131
Id.
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the interest in protecting the public and deterring future criminal
conduct,132 although in Crandon the Internet was used to contact a
future victim directly.133 Based on this distinction, Harding does
not seem to fall “within the teachings of Crandon,”134 and seems to
contradict the Third Circuit’s decision in Freeman (decided the
same month as Harding) rejecting a ban on Internet use for a
defendant who had been convicted of possessing child
pornography that he had loaded into his computer.135 In fact, the
Third Circuit distinguished Freeman from Crandon since there
was no evidence that Freeman had used the Internet to contact
young children,136 which also may have been the case in
Harding.137
Furthermore, Harding contradicts the Second
Circuit’s reasoning in Sofsky, which the Freeman court cited for
the proposition that a ban on Internet use would prevent access to
“benign internet usage.”138
In any event, there is some
inconsistency within the Third Circuit as to what circumstances
support Internet use restrictions as a condition of supervised
release.
In United States v. Paul, Ronald Scott Paul was restricted from
using computers or the Internet in the wake of his prison sentence
for knowing possession of child pornography after numerous
pornographic images of children were found on his personal
computer, in addition to the photographs, magazines, books, and
videotapes containing similar images that were found in his
home.139 Paul admitted to having downloaded the computer
images from the Internet, but argued that the prohibition was too
broad and would restrict his ability to use computers and the
Internet for legitimate purposes.140 The court, however, chose
instead to focus on Paul’s use of the Internet and e-mail “to
encourage exploitation of children by seeking out fellow ‘boy
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

See id. at *4–*5.
See supra text accompanying note 114.
Harding, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371, at *5.
United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 392.
See supra text accompanying notes 130–31.
Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392.
United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 168.
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lovers’ and providing them with advice on how to find and obtain
access to ‘young friends,’”141 and to “advise fellow consumers of
child pornography how to ‘scout’ single, dysfunctional parents and
gain access to their children and to solicit the participation of likeminded individuals in trips to ‘visit’ children in Mexico.”142 As in
Crandon, to which the court in this case analogized, much of
Paul’s predatory behavior occurred through the Internet, which he
used to “‘initiate and facilitate a pattern of criminal conduct and
victimization.’”143 Thus, the court reasoned that Paul’s crime was,
in fact, very closely related to the Internet and affirmed the ban.144
The discussion above indicates that the role of the Internet in
the commission of the crime is a crucial factor in the determination
of whether to uphold a supervised release condition prohibiting its
use, although this factor is not necessarily dispositive.145 For
example, the Sofsky court overturned the Internet ban for a felon
who used the Internet to download child pornography and to
exchange it with others, focusing instead on the potential of such a
restriction to infringe upon the defendant’s liberty.146 Sofsky’s
conduct, however, was not as egregious as the use of the Internet to
contact potential victims as in Crandon,147 or to teach others how
to do the same as in Paul.148 Nonetheless, other factors bearing on
whether courts should ban certain offenders from using the Internet
altogether must be explored further.
III. CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING INTERNET USE RESTRICTIONS
Internet bans only should be permitted in circumstances where
they are warranted based upon narrow criteria because they have
the potential to inhibit access to a number of resources with respect
141

Id. at 169.
Id. at 168.
143
Id. at 169 (quoting United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Although the Paul court quoted the language of White, a case that overturned an Internet
ban, it distinguished White factually and rejected its reasoning. See id. at 169–70.
144
Id. at 168–70.
145
See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002).
146
See supra notes 84–96.
147
See supra notes 113–25.
148
See supra notes 139–44.
142
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to many different fundamental uses, such as communication,
education, governance, and information gathering.149 While terms
of supervised release tend to last only a few years,150 restrictions
on Internet use may prevent people from further developing
important skills, such as those required in the workplace.151 Such
commonplace uses of the Internet are rapidly becoming essential
and should not so readily be denied.
As such, courts should consider the manner in which the
Internet was employed to commit a crime when fashioning
supervised release conditions that restrict Internet use. Attempts
have been made to create these distinctions, which focus on the
nature of the underlying offense as well as the nature of the
Internet use.152 In addition, comparing the deprivation of Internet
use to other types of conditions that implicate certain rights,
liberties, and commonplace activities is a useful method of
analyzing the way in which courts exercise their sentencing
discretion.
A. Internet Crime Versus Internet-Related Crime
While beneficial in countless ways, the advent of new
technologies over recent decades also has given rise to numerous
new types of crimes as well as new methods of committing crime
in general.153 Accordingly, there have been attempts to reform

149

See discussion supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFENDERS RETURNING TO
FEDERAL PRISON, 1986–97, at 2 (2000) (stating that the average term of supervised
release imposed during 1998 was forty-one months), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/orfp97.htm (last revised Sept. 22, 2000).
151
See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
152
See discussion supra Part III.A.
153
See Mark D. Rasch, Criminal Law and the Internet, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS:
A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 141, 141 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr. ed.,
1996) (“While computer technology permits business to work more efficiently,
communicate more effectively, and become more productive, the computer, as a tool,
permits those with less benevolent intention to evade the law. What’s worse, with the
advent of new information technologies, more information—and more sensitive
information—is stored in a manner which makes it more accessible to more individuals—
not all of whom have purely wholesome motives.”).
150
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criminal laws to sufficiently address computer crime.154 In the
process, distinctions between “computer crime” and “computer
related crime” have arisen.155 Similarly, a significant distinction
could be drawn between Internet crime and Internet-related crime,
based on the respective relationships between the crimes and the
Internet.156
In attempting to define computer crime, one commentator
suggested, “computer crime is a criminal offense for which the
knowledge of computers is necessary for the successful
commission of the offense.”157 An analysis of this definition
states:
Such a definition distinguishes true computer crimes from
computer related crimes in which computers are used as
tools or targets of the criminal offense, but for which
knowledge of the workings of a computer is not essential
for the successful commission of the offense. Thus, a chain
letter typed on a computer’s word processing software and
thereafter mailed to victims of a fraudulent solicitation is
probably not a computer crime, despite the fact that
knowledge of the word processing software facilitated the
commission of the offense. A similar chain letter sent out
over the Internet, and soliciting electronic funds transfers
comes closer to a true computer crime especially if
responses are electronically sorted or manipulated.158

154

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 1996: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS (1997)
(discussing why new computer crime legislation was needed), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030_anal.html (last updated July 31, 2003).
155
See Rasch, supra note 153, at 143.
156
For instance, Kevin Mitnick’s use of the Internet to hack into computer networks of
large corporations should be categorized as an Internet crime, because the crime itself
requires Internet technology. See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. By
contrast, Gregory Sofsky’s crime—the receipt of child pornography—did not specifically
require the Internet, although the Internet facilitated the crime’s commission. See United
States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, such acts should be considered
Internet-related crime. See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
157
See Rasch, supra note 153, at 143 (citing DONN PARKER, FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME
(1983)).
158
Id.
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Under these criteria, it would seem as if the simple use of the
Internet to download illegal material, such as child pornography,
would be considered an Internet-related crime. Conversely, a more
elaborate scheme requiring use of Internet technology to carry out
the crime, such as hacking into protected servers and databases,
would rise to the level of direct Internet crime.
Furthermore, in addressing the need to update criminal laws
with respect to computers, the Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has
identified the different ways in which computers are connected to
crime:
First, a computer may be used as a target of the offense. In
these cases, the criminal’s goal is to steal information from,
or cause damage to a computer, computer system, or
computer network. Second, the computer may be a tool of
the offense. This occurs when an individual uses a
computer to facilitate some traditional offense such as fraud
. . . . Last, computers are sometimes incidental to the
offense, but significant to law enforcement because they
contain evidence of a crime.159
In addition, the DOJ has indicated that “[a]lthough certain
computer crimes appear simply to be old crimes committed in new
ways (e.g., the bank teller who uses a computer program to steal
money is still committing bank fraud), some computer offenses
find their genesis in [] new technologies and must be specifically
addressed by statute.”160 Thus, some crimes involving computers
are illegal due to underlying criminal conduct, but others arise out
of specific use of certain technologies and could not be committed
otherwise.161
The above analysis regarding computers may be applied to the
Internet to demonstrate that there are people who use the Internet
to commit crimes that do not require online resources, crimes that
159

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 154.
See id.; Rasch, supra note 153, at 143.
161
See Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment, Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403,
409–15 (1996) (discussing different categories of crimes committed on the Internet).
160
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they might be predisposed to commit in any case, and there are
people who commit crimes that require Internet technology.162 For
example, in Kevin Mitnick’s infamous acts of hacking into
corporate networks, computers and the Internet would be identified
under this analysis as both a target and a tool of the offense.163
Other cases are less clear on whether the Internet was a necessary
tool, or merely incidental to the crime, however. In the Internet
child pornography cases such as Sofsky, White, and Harding, in
which the defendants used the Internet to download or order illicit
materials,164 computers and the Internet could be viewed either as
incidental to the commission of the crime of possessing child
pornography, or as tools to facilitate offenses that could have been
committed in other ways.165
This is a fine distinction, and although courts have broad
discretion in imposing supervised release conditions, they should
be careful in identifying which type of Internet use has occurred
and whether banning Internet use will help deter the conduct
underlying the offense, given the Internet’s pervasiveness and its
many practical functions.166 For example, the Third Circuit likely
would have reached a different result in Harding—in which it
upheld an Internet ban for a defendant convicted of possessing
child pornography on his computer167—if it had carefully
scrutinized the extent to which the Internet was a required element
in the commission of the offense, since child pornography has
existed long before the advent of the Internet and surely can be
obtained elsewhere.168 Crandon and Paul are less clear, but in
162
Compare United States v. Harding, No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371, at *1
(3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2003) (receiving child pornography), with United States v. Mitnick, No.
97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *1 (9th Cir. May 20, 1998) (possession of
unauthorized access devices with intent to defraud).
163
See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
164
Harding upheld an Internet ban, while Sofsky and White overturned the restrictions.
See discussion supra Part II.
165
See supra text accompanying notes 85, 97, 127 and accompanying text for
descriptions of the offenses in these cases.
166
See discussion supra Part I.B.
167
See supra text accompanying notes 126–38.
168
See Devon Ishii Peterson, Comment, Child Pornography on the Internet: The Effect
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 on Tort Recovery for Victims
Against Internet Service Providers, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 763, 766–67 (2002) (discussing
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those cases the courts perceived the defendants’ respective uses of
the Internet to solicit contact with future victims (Crandon) or to
find others with similar tastes willing to teach them how to target
potential victims (Paul) as serious threats to public safety—threats
uniquely furthered by the Internet.169 Certainly, these cases come
closer to actual Internet crime than the crime in Harding, though
they do not rise to the level of the crime in Mitnick, in which the
use of Internet technology was essential to the hacker’s illegal
breach of secure data systems.170
A notable consideration in the analysis of Internet crime and
Internet-related crime is that the anonymity, or pseudonymity as it
were,171 afforded by the Internet likely emboldens offenders whose
shame or fear of getting caught might otherwise make them more
reluctant to commit certain offenses.172 In Crandon, the court
identified the Internet as an “omnipresent” part of American life,173
but upheld the Internet ban due to its role in initiating contact with
the victim.174 As the Peterson court noted, however, use of the
telephone to commit a crime such as fraud would not justify a
condition of probation barring use of the telephone altogether,175
and other courts have agreed.176 Interestingly, in Crandon, in
which the defendant used the Internet to develop a rapport and
eventually a sexual relationship with a young girl, the defendant
and the girl communicated regularly over the telephone after their

the history of commercial child pornography); Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the
Internet: The New Battle Against Child Pornography, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 541,
542–43 (1998) (naming several child pornographic magazines and noting that child
pornography exists in many forms).
169
See supra notes 124–25, 142–44 and accompanying text.
170
See Greg Miller, Hacking Legend’s Sign-Off, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at A1
(discussing Mitnick’s crimes).
171
See Rasch, supra note 153, at 143.
172
See id. at 144 (discussing how the anonymity provided by the Internet can impact a
user’s behavior).
173
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Unquestionably,
computer networks and the Internet will continue to become an omnipresent aspect of
American life.”).
174
See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text.
175
See supra text accompanying note 78.
176
See, e.g., United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001); supra text
accompanying note 101.
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initial encounter.177 Nevertheless, the fact that Crandon used the
telephone to maintain contact with his young victim did not factor
into the sentencing determination, though perhaps it should have in
light of the court’s justification of the Internet ban.178 The court
either viewed the Internet as the principal and more insidious
device with which Crandon preyed on the young girl to solicit
sexual contact, or it took for granted the essential nature of the
telephone.179 The role of the Internet in the commission of the
crime is an important consideration with respect to sentencing
conditions, and courts tending to enforce Internet bans seem to
have done so based on the ease with which people can
communicate and obtain information online.180
Whether the Internet facilitated the crime was a crucial part of
the conclusions of the courts, particularly for those courts putting
less emphasis on the extent of the Internet’s role in modern
society.181 As discussed above, however, the Internet has become
an indispensable medium, access to which should not readily be
denied.182 For this reason, courts carefully should distinguish
Internet crime from Internet-related crime, as the inquiry with the
latter relates more to the underlying offense for which the
defendant has been convicted, and craft supervised release
conditions more narrowly in order to prevent deprivation of
technology whose prevalence and usefulness continues to grow
exponentially.

177

See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125, 127.
See id. at 127–28.
179
Cf. United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating Internet
restrictions and stating that “[a]lthough a defendant might use the telephone to commit
fraud, this would not justify a condition of probation that includes an absolute bar on the
use of telephones”); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001)
(vacating Internet restrictions and stating that the communication facilitated by Internet
technology “may be likened to that of the telephone”).
180
See discussion supra Part II.B.
181
See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e reject
the White court’s implication that an absolute prohibition on accessing computers or the
Internet is per se an unacceptable condition of supervised release, simply because such a
prohibition might prevent a defendant from using a computer at the library to ‘get a
weather forecast’ or to ‘read a newspaper online’ during the supervised release term.
(quoting United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2001))).
182
See discussion supra Part I.B.
178
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B. Supervised Release Conditions With Respect to Other Rights
and Liberties
A great impediment to calling upon sentencing courts to limit
the use of Internet bans, regardless of the role of the Internet in the
commission of the crime, is that previous arguments against
supervised release restrictions as unconstitutional or as intruding
on other perceived liberties have been largely rejected.183 In the
decisions discussed above, which overturned Internet bans, none of
the courts rejected the restrictions as unconstitutional, but rather
cited to the sentencing guidelines standard that the condition must
not involve a “greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably
In general, First Amendment challenges to
necessary.”184
probation conditions, such as those in Mitnick185 and Crandon,186
have been unsuccessful. The Crandon court cited the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Ritter
for the proposition that “‘even though supervised release
conditions may affect constitutional rights such as First
Amendment protections, most restrictions are valid if directly
related to advancing the individual’s rehabilitation and to
protecting the public from recidivism.’”187
1. Freedom of Association
Several cases have addressed restrictions on freedom of
association,188 a right that specifically relates to the function of the
Internet as a communication and information-sharing medium.189
183

See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2 (9th Cir. May 20,
1998).
184
See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
185
Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2.
186
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127–28.
187
Id. at 128 (quoting United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997)).
188
E.g., United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th
Cir. 1974); see also Stephen S. Cook, Selected Constitutional Questions Regarding
Federal Offender Supervision, 23 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 3–5 (1997)
(discussing First Amendment concerns arising in the federal sentencing and probation
process).
189
See Hyne, supra note 68, at 239–40 (discussing First Amendment challenges to the
restriction of computer access as a condition of probation or supervised release).
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Thus, it can be argued that an Internet ban would prevent
association with those generally contacted through this medium.190
The two principal concerns supporting limitations on freedom of
association are rehabilitation and public safety.191 In addition,
freedom of association cases relate to supervised release conditions
that require filtering Internet use or permitting access subject to
probation officer approval, since in both instances the restrictions
seek to prevent specific activities or contact related to the
offense.192
In one case, relied upon by the Mitnick court in its rejection of
the constitutional challenge presented, a defendant pleaded guilty
to “being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm” and was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by a period of
supervised release during which he could not be involved “in any
motorcycle club activities.”193 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendant’s freedom of association challenge, referring to the
sentencing court’s broad discretion as well as to a judicial
articulation of sentencing principles: “Probation conditions may
seek to prevent reversion into a former crime-inducing life-style by
barring contact with old haunts and associates, even though the
activities may be legal.”194 Similarly, another court upheld the
restriction preventing a white supremacist leader who pled guilty
to possession of an unregistered firearm from associating with
skinheads or any neo-Nazi or white supremacist organization.195
The defendant did not appeal the condition of not associating with
white supremacist organizations, but he did appeal the requirement
barring association with other skinheads or neo-Nazis.196 The
sentencing court explained the correlation between the restriction
and the crime: “‘Because those groups embrace violence and the
190

Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128.
See Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 480 (holding that restriction on defendant’s association
rights is valid if primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of
the public, and reasonably related to such ends) (citing United States v. Terrigno, 838
F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988)).
192
See Hyne, supra note 68, at 240 (discussing how Internet use can be considered
“associating”).
193
Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 479 (9th Cir. 1991).
194
Id. at 480 (citing Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556–57 (9th Cir. 1974)).
195
See United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991).
196
Id.
191
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threat of violence as a method of advancing their views, [the court
found] that [his] association with them would create a high
likelihood that [he] would be drawn into that same
behavior.. . .’”197 Affirming this part of the sentencing court’s
ruling, the appellate court found that “the district court was correct
that [the defendant] need[ed] to be separated from other members
of white supremacist groups to have a chance of staying out of
trouble.”198
These cases are relevant in the Internet context because the
freedom to use the Internet, while not a constitutional right itself,
necessarily implicates freedom of speech and association.199 These
cases make clear, however, that a restriction will be upheld despite
a constitutional challenge if it appears likely that a certain forum
could lead to future misconduct of the same sort, a consideration
underlying the supervised release conditions upheld in Crandon
and Paul.200 In Crandon, for example, the defendant had utilized
the Internet in a predatory manner;201 the Paul defendant went
online partly to counsel others on victimizing children.202
Likewise, the Mitnick court upheld the restriction on computerrelated employment in order to protect the public by preventing the
defendant from engaging in his former criminal activities.203
Because several of the Internet ban cases discussed above
pertain to child pornography, an examination of freedom of
association cases of this kind is worthwhile, especially with respect
to the public safety element that such cases necessarily

197

Id. at 575.
Id. at 575–76.
199
See Hyne, supra note 68, at 239–40.
200
See supra notes 113–25, 139–44 and accompanying text.
201
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999) (beginning a sexual
relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl).
202
United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2001).
203
See Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *3–*4. Mitnick served five years in
federal prison for stealing software and altering data at Motorola, Novell, Nokia, Sun
Microsystems, and the University of Southern California. Associated Press, Hacker Back
On Air, supra note 8. Prosecutors accused him of causing tens of millions of dollars in
damage to corporate computer networks. Id.
198
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implicate.204 The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bee205 upheld a
supervised release condition whereby a child molester (1) could
not have contact with any minors without probation officer
approval; (2) could not loiter within a certain distance of schools,
parks, playgrounds, arcades, or any other places primarily used by
children; and (3) could not possess any sexually stimulating
material considered inappropriate or patronize any place where
such material is available.206 The facts in cases such Bee and
Crandon make sympathy for the defendant difficult.207 Although
the defendant in Bee claimed that the first two conditions were too
broad and that the third condition was a First Amendment violation
and unrelated to his offense, the court upheld all three
restrictions.208 As to the conditions barring unapproved contact
with children and preventing the defendant from loitering in places
primarily used by children, the court quoted the defendant’s own
acknowledgement that he would be expected to “‘err on the side of
avoiding places that the probation officer or the court might deem
unacceptable.’”209
The justification for upholding the association restrictions is
easier to grasp than the rationale for affirming the restriction on
sexually stimulating material, apparently including legal adult
pornography.210 This relates to the argument that the restriction on
Internet usage denies access to legitimate, legal material, an
argument to which some courts have been more sympathetic than
others, depending in part on the relationship of the Internet use to

204

Cook, supra note 188, at 4 (stating that restrictions of association rights have been
upheld based on the rationale that the association would encourage the individual to
repeat criminal conduct).
205
162 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1998).
206
Id. at 1234.
207
In Crandon, for example, the defendant initiated a sexual relationship with a
fourteen-year-old girl through the Internet. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying
text.
208
Bee, 162 F.3d at 1234–36.
209
Id. at 1235–36.
210
See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that prohibition on accessing Internet is unacceptable because such
a ban might impede legitimate uses of the Internet).
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the offense.211 Furthermore, Bee involved overriding public safety
concerns, as indicated by the court’s expectation that the defendant
err on the side of caution by avoiding places that probably would
be considered unacceptable, but that had not yet been designated as
such.212 The courts in Crandon and Paul employed similar
reasoning to affirm Internet ban conditions, based on the nature of
the defendants’ respective Internet uses and the great potential for
harm to the public, particularly children, if they were to revert to
their former behavior.213
The court in United States v. Loy reached a different
conclusion with respect to legal adult material.214 In Loy, Ray
Donald Loy was convicted for possession of child pornography,
some of which he had a role in producing, with a sentence that
included supervised release conditions prohibiting possession of
any pornography and unsupervised contact with minors.215 The
court upheld the contact element of the condition, excluding
accidental contact such as in public places from the condition, but
overturned the proscription on pornography, holding that it was
overbroad.216 The court condoned a restriction on possession of
even legal pornography, as in Bee, but it found that the restriction
had to be more carefully crafted since, as originally drafted, the
policymaking power was granted to the probation officer and the
condition failed to put Loy on notice of what material he could or
could not access.217 The court also noted that “[a] probationary
condition is not ‘narrowly tailored’ if it restricts First Amendment
freedoms without any resulting benefit to public safety.”218 Thus,
while supervised release conditions may restrict fundamental rights
211

Compare United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating an
Internet ban imposed on a felon who had pled guilty to bank larceny, was previously
convicted of incest, and had accessed legal adult pornography on his home computer),
with United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding Internet
restrictions in light of fact that defendant used the Internet to develop an illegal sexual
relationship).
212
Bee, 162 F.3d at 1234–36.
213
See supra Part II.B.
214
United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2001).
215
Id. at 254–55.
216
See id. at 254, 266–67.
217
See id. at 266–67.
218
Id. at 266.
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in some instances, they should not do so unnecessarily.219 Yet, this
is the potential result of imposing Internet bans that only permit
use with probation officer approval, particularly where such use
does not entail a direct threat to the public. At the same time,
however, such arrangements may provide less restrictive
alternatives to blanket Internet bans.220
Filtering Internet content and subjecting otherwise banned
Internet use to probation officer approval are analogous to freedom
of association limitations, since such conditions prohibit
defendants from associating with certain people or accessing
certain types of material.221 In Mitnick, the court rejected the
defendant’s contention that the requirement of probation officer
approval for access to computers and computer-related equipment
was too broad: “The fact that Mitnick may engage in otherwise
prohibited conduct with the probation officer’s approval makes the
conditions imposed less restrictive [than] an outright ban on such
conduct.”222
Yet, several of the courts emphasizing the
pervasiveness of Internet use in modern society to reject blanket
Internet bans have not been persuaded that allowing access through
probation officer discretion is a mitigating factor justifying the
condition.223 For example, the Sofsky court stated that “[a]lthough
219

See id. at 264 (stating that to avoid First Amendment infirmity, a probation condition
must be narrowly tailored and directly related to the goals of protecting the public and
promoting a defendant’s rehabilitation) (citing Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128). The Supreme
Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), opined on the purpose behind
the requirement that laws be reasonably precise:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. . . . Second, . . . [a] vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis. . . . Third . . . where a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas
of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms.
Id. at 108–09, noted in Loy, 237 F.3d at 262.
220
See Richtel, supra note 1 (discussing technologies allowing a probation officer to
remotely monitor an offender’s computer activity).
221
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
222
United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *3 n.1
(9th Cir. May 20, 1998).
223
See supra notes 96, 104–05 and accompanying text.
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the condition prohibiting Sofsky from accessing a computer or the
Internet without his probation officer’s approval is reasonably
related to the purposes of his sentencing, in light of the nature of
his offense, we hold that the condition inflicts a greater deprivation
on Sofsky’s liberty than reasonably necessary.”224 Furthermore,
the court concluded that alternative methods, such as government
sting operations or unannounced inspections of his computer, were
available to enforce narrower Internet restrictions relating to
Sofsky’s offense of downloading child pornography and would
prevent the denial of access to legitimate uses of the Internet.225
Thus, the courts in Mitnick and Sofsky reached very different
conclusions with respect to permitting otherwise forbidden Internet
access on the condition of probation officer approval, stemming
from their views about the Internet and about the Internet’s relation
to the offenses.226
In a similar consideration of alternative ways to police Internet
use, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in remanding
White to determine the meaning of a sentencing court’s Internet
use restrictions, explored the possibility of Internet filtering.227
The Tenth Circuit found that the sentencing court’s conditions
were potentially overbroad or too narrow.228 As part of this
analysis, the court stated that installation of filtering software into
a defendant’s computer appropriately could focus an Internet use
restriction, but that such an approach was limited by the
effectiveness of the technology and the possibility of
circumvention by either the technologically savvy user or the user
who simply decided to use a different computer.229 After
cautioning against a blanket ban on computer use and commenting
on the ubiquity of cyberspace, the court concluded that “any
224
United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Sofsky for the propositions that (1)
probation officer approval does not make a ban on Internet usage less restrictive and (2)
there are alternative methods of enforcing more limited use restrictions).
225
Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126–27.
226
See supra notes 84–96, 109–12 and accompanying text
227
See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. White,
244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)).
228
See White, 244 F.3d at 1205–07.
229
See id. at 1206–07.
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condition limiting White’s use of a computer or access to the
Internet must reflect these realities and permit reasonable
monitoring by a probation officer,”230 without indicating how this
should be achieved.
Freedom of association restrictions largely have been upheld as
long as they comport with the sentencing guidelines and goals,
under which preventing criminal conduct and protecting the public
are primary concerns and must be balanced against the liberty
interests of the defendant.231 These decisions do not bode well for
the constitutional challenge to Internet bans, which involve similar
balancing due to both the nature of Internet use and its perception
as a fundamental part of modern society.232 For example, the
White court did not overturn the Internet ban based on the
defendant’s First and Fourteenth Amendment arguments, but
instead focused on the meaning of the condition and its potential
for overbreadth, given the numerous legitimate and commonplace
functions of the Internet.233And as the court in Crandon concluded,
“in this case the restrictions on employment and First Amendment
freedoms are permissible because the special condition is narrowly
tailored and is directly related to deterring Crandon and protecting
the public.”234 If courts are to reject Internet use bans, they are not
likely to do so based on constitutional challenges, but rather on an
evaluation of the competing interests of the defendant and the
public.235
2. Driving
Another type of sentencing condition that relates to performing
commonplace activities is the revocation of the driver’s license of
a defendant, particularly with respect to driving under the influence
(“DUI”) cases.236 As one article on license suspensions observed,
230

See id. at 1207.
See supra notes 193–213 and accompanying text.
232
See discussion supra Part II.A.
233
See White, 244 F.3d at 1207; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
234
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128.
235
See discussion supra Part II.A.
236
See Carlos F. Ramirez, Note, Administrative License Suspensions, Criminal
Prosecution and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 923, 923 n.6
(1996).
231
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“the livelihood of the defendant and his or her family may be
dependent on the ability to operate a motor vehicle.”237 The article
further states that
“[i]n this society where public transportation is either nonexistent or is, at best, inadequate and entire commercial
shopping areas are located in suburbs surrounding our
cities, [a driver’s license can no longer be viewed] as
merely a privilege which is given by the State and which is
subject to revocation at any time.”238
This correlates to the arguments regarding the ever-increasing
use of the Internet for employment-related purposes, since it has
become essential to conducting many types of businesses, in
addition to its value with respect to communications, research, and
commerce.239 Those denied the use of computers and the Internet
may be technologically immobilized, which can hurt their ability to
compete, or perhaps even participate, in the modern economy.240
Although filtering out Web sites related to the defendant’s offense
or allowing partial access with probation officer approval may
mitigate this effect, courts otherwise averse to blanket Internet
bans have not been receptive to such conditions and have deemed
them overbroad in any event.241
Driver’s license suspensions in DUI cases, however, often have
been upheld based on the interests in protecting the public and
deference to the power of designated authorities to regulate
licensed activities.242 The first reason for these sanctions, known
as Administrative License Suspension (“ALS”),243 is to protect the
237

Id. at 943.
Id. at 950 (quoting Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619, at *5 (Ill.
App. Ct. June 27, 1995) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of DUI prosecution
subsequent to the suspension of the defendant’s drivers license on double jeopardy
grounds)). Of course, “for the person living in a city with different modes of
transportation, the harm may not be so great. But, for the majority of people in this
country, who live in suburbs or rural areas, this can cause substantial or total
immobilization.” Id. at 950 n.181.
239
See discussion supra Part I.B.
240
See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002).
241
See discussion supra Part II.A.
242
See Ramirez, supra note 236, at 930–36, 951–52.
243
See id. at 923.
238
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public by deterring drunk driving, both by prohibiting the
defendant from driving and instilling fear that a license could be
suspended as a result such an offense.244 The prohibition can be
analogized to Internet restrictions, since it effectively prevents the
defendant from using the tool with which he committed the crime.
The DUI offense is the crime itself, however, and cannot be
separated into distinct, criminal components, since neither driving
a car nor drinking alcohol is by itself a crime.245 It is the
combination of these elements that creates the crime.246 In
contrast, the crimes for which many of the defendants in the
Internet cases were convicted did not necessitate the use of the
Internet, although it arguably facilitated the behavior in certain
instances.247 Thus, unlike with DUI cases, it is possible with
Internet-related offenses to separate the means by which the
offense was committed from the crime itself. Moreover, the
defendants in the Internet cases, with the exception of Mitnick,
were guilty of separate, underlying conduct for which there are
criminal statutes unrelated to Internet technology.248

244

See id. at 932–33 (noting cases that have concluded that public safety justifies
administrative license suspension statutes).
245
See, e.g., Villarini & Henry, LLP, So You Have Been Arrested for DWI in New
York?, at http://villariniandhenry.lawoffice.com/articles.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004)
(listing the “critical elements” of a DWI conviction). The above analysis assumes,
respectively, that (1) the driver has a valid license and (2) the drinker is over twenty-one
years of age.
246
See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TR. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1996) (operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs).
247
E.g., United States v. Harding, No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371 (3d Cir.
Jan. 28, 2003); Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; White, 244 F.3d 1199; see also supra text
accompanying notes 163–65.
248
See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 387 (3d Cir. 2003) (receipt and
possession of child pornography); Harding, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371, at *1 (receipt
of child pornography); Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (receipt of child pornography); United
States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir. 2001) (knowing possession of child
pornography); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2001) (bank
larceny, with prior conviction for incest); White, 244 F.3d at 1201 (receiving child
pornography and violation of condition of supervised release); United States v. Crandon,
173 F.3d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1999) (receiving child pornography); see also discussion
supra Part II.
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The second significant reason advanced for the ALS sanction is
that a driver’s license is considered a privilege and not a right.249
This argument contends that “the government reserves the power
to revoke a license if the licensee fails to act in accordance with set
regulations. In an ALS, the government merely exercises the
power to revoke the driving privileges it has afforded.”250 Unlike
driving, however, Internet use is not a regulated activity or
privilege for which state permission is required. It may not rise to
the level of a right, but it is also difficult to argue that Internet use
is a privilege granted by a certain entity, as it simply entails
obtaining a connection from a commercial service provider, or
availing oneself of any other connected computer terminal, for
example, in a public library or at most educational institutions.251
In sum, while the similarities between the nature of Internet use
and of driving are clear, the reasons for restricting each activity
subsequent to a criminal conviction are evidently quite different.
Accordingly, it should be more difficult to restrict Internet use as
the result of a conviction for an underlying crime that the Internet
facilitated than it is to suspend a license due to driving under the
influence, although courts apparently possess great discretion in
both instances.252
The comparison to other activities that have been limited by
supervised release conditions offers a different perspective on
Internet use restrictions.253 As demonstrated through the freedom
of association challenges to supervised release conditions, the
constitutionality of the condition is irrelevant as long as it is
consistent with the criteria of the sentencing guidelines, criteria
which afford courts broad discretion in determining constraints
where the public interest is at stake.254 The analogy to driver’s
249

See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text; see also Ramirez, supra note 236, at
935–36.
250
Ramirez, supra note 236, at 936 (citing State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d
1044, 1056 (N.M. 1995) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to administrative license
revocation hearing)).
251
See generally DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 35–56 (discussing how and
when Americans access the Internet and Internet use among young people).
252
See discussion supra Part I.A; see generally Ramirez, supra note 236, at 924–43
(discussing conflicting judicial interpretations with respect to ALS proceedings).
253
See discussion supra Parts III.B.1–.2.
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See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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license suspensions in the wake of DUI offenses is not persuasive,
as key differences exist in the reasoning and authority behind such
conditions.255 Nonetheless, the courts often have been granted the
discretion to make their own decisions.256
C. The Significance of the Underlying Crime
Fashioning supervised release conditions entails a great tension
between the interests of protecting the public and preventing too
great a deprivation of liberty of the individual being sentenced.257
This same tension applies to the Internet, since it has bestowed
numerous benefits upon society as a whole, but also has created
new crimes and new manners in which to commit existing
crimes.258 The very sentencing guidelines from which this conflict
emerges afford the courts a significant amount of discretion in
crafting and reviewing the conditions intended to deter such future
criminal conduct.259 Some courts have used this discretion
ostensibly to prevent certain crimes in which the Internet is viewed
as essential to their commission, by restricting or altogether
forbidding Internet access.260
Other courts, however, have
approached the issue differently, viewing the Internet as a part of
everyday life and concluding that its deprivation risks too great an
infringement on an individual’s liberty.261
Courts should take care to limit Internet restrictions to those
cases where the Internet was a necessary tool of the offense,
without which the underlying crime could not have been
committed. The goal of the supervised release condition should be
to deter the underlying conduct, not to restrict one of many
methods by which the crime has been realized—especially when
that method does not involve a weapon, per se, but a technology
with abundant legitimate uses.262 In many cases, there is a fine line
255

See supra notes 246–48, 250–51 and accompanying text.
See Ramirez, supra note 236, at 930–36.
257
See supra notes 24–25, 28 for a description of the factors enumerated by the
sentencing guidelines with respect to supervised release conditions.
258
See supra text accompanying notes 159–60.
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260
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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between the use of the Internet to facilitate the crime and use that
is merely incidental to its commission.263
The threshold analysis, thus, should be whether the defendant
could have committed the crime without going online to do so.
For example, with respect to a hacking crime like that in Mitnick,
the Internet was both a tool and a target of the crime, and could not
have occurred otherwise.264 Crandon is a case where the
distinction is less clear, as it is not evident that the defendant could
have forged a relationship with his young victim without first
befriending her anonymously in an online chat room, as such a
relationship may have been rebuffed or altogether avoided in the
physical world.265 In cases such as Sofsky and Harding, in which
the crimes involved possession of child pornography, it is clear
that while the Internet has certainly made such illicit material
easier to come by, the defendants could have obtained it elsewhere.
In view of the unique nature and extensive uses of Internet
technology, courts should be wary of such distinctions and
formulate supervised release conditions accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Sentencing determinations entail a difficult balancing act, as
they are highly fact-specific endeavors that often involve
unsympathetic defendants whose liberty becomes less of an
interest depending on the nature of the crime. The willingness of
courts to use their broad discretion to carefully examine the
relationship of the underlying criminal conduct to the involvement
of the Internet will likely depend on the extent to which they view
the Internet as a fundamental resource, although, as demonstrated,
public safety concerns often override such considerations.266 As
the Internet’s importance to modern society continues to increase
in the coming years and its relationship to individual liberty
interests deepens, it will be interesting to examine the direction
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264
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See supra text accompanying notes 163–65, 247.
See supra text accompanying notes 159, 163.
See supra notes 114–16, 124, 169 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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courts follow in establishing supervised release conditions that
restrict Internet use.

